CaseAdvancedShipping & Model Lifecycle / Model migration and version changes for users / #19

How do you handle a migration that improves most cases and regresses a critical one?

The direct answer
Track a separate pass rate for every critical finding type, not one aggregate score, and give each a floor that can't sit below what's already live in production. When a migration clears the aggregate but breaches a critical floor, don't ship it as one all-or-nothing swap: keep the old model's check running for that one finding until the new model clears the bar, and ship everything else. The tracking can show you the regression. Whether the aggregate gain is worth accepting it at all is still a call a person makes.
Do this, in order
  1. Give every critical finding type its own gated pass rate, with its own floor.Why: a floor tied to one finding can't get diluted by the other twenty-nine rows on the sheet.
  2. Never ship a migration as one all-or-nothing swap once a critical floor is breached.Why: keeping the old check running for just that finding buys time to fix it without holding back everything else.
  3. Test the regression in a live shadow pilot, not just against the fixed eval set.Why: real cases arriving in real time settle the argument that a small eval set is too thin to trust.
  4. Size a finding by what a miss costs, not by how often it shows up.Why: pneumothorax is under one percent of scans and still the row that decides whether someone gets a chest tube today or tomorrow.
  5. Keep watching the aggregate too, it still answers a real question.Why: it's the number that says whether the broad rollout is worth doing at all, once the critical floor is safe.
  6. Put the accept-or-hold call in front of a person once the data is clean.Why: the tracking shows you the size of the gain and the size of the regression, it doesn't weigh them against each other for you.

How to answer this, stage by stage

Seven moves. Name the leading signal before the story, or it sounds like Iskra just got lucky finding the regression.

1
Scope it to one candidate, one hospital, one deadline
Say it like this
"Let's ground this in one team. Iskra Kendrick runs the report-drafting product at Pellard Health. Every six weeks the team retrains the model that drafts chest X-ray reports for radiologists to review. The newest candidate, RX-5, is due to replace the model running live at Cavendish Medical this coming Monday."
Why this works
A migration decision means nothing as an abstraction. One candidate, one hospital, one Monday makes the stakes real before any framework gets named.
2
Say your structure out loud
Say it like this
"I'll run this through LEAD. L is the real outcome a migration decision protects, not just a better dashboard. E is the early signal, the number that would catch a problem before it reaches a patient. A is how the wrong metric gets played, even by accident. D is what the tracking still can't decide for you."
Why this works
Naming the four letters up front tells the interviewer this is a metric-design decision with a real mechanism behind it, not a vague call for caution.
3
Reframe what the question is actually testing
Say it like this
"This sounds like a question about how careful you are before a launch. It's really a question about which number you trust. An aggregate score is a fair average across everything a model touches. A patient having a lung emergency doesn't care what the aggregate says. The two can move in opposite directions at the same time, and only one number on the dashboard will ever tell you that's happening."
Why this works
Moves the answer from "be careful" to the real mechanism: an aggregate can hide a rare, severe regression inside a rising average.
4
Give the decision straight
Say it like this
"Here's what I'd do. Kill the single go, no-go number. Every migration candidate gets a pass rate per finding type, checked against a fixed, audited set, and the finding types tagged critical, pneumothorax included, get a floor that can't sit below what's already live. RX-5 clears the aggregate and breaches that floor on pneumothorax. So it ships everywhere except that one finding. Pneumothorax keeps running through RX-4's check until RX-5 clears the bar on a fresh eval."
Why this works
Names the exact mechanism, a per-finding gate with a floor tied to production, and the exact decision, a partial ship, not a vague call for more testing.
5
Prove it with the number that shows the aggregate was hiding it
Say it like this
"Here's why that matters. Across the six builds that led to RX-5, the aggregate score climbed steadily, 84 to 93 percent. Pneumothorax recall on the same eval set held at 91, then 90, then 92, right through build three. Build four is where the team changed the training mix, and pneumothorax recall fell off a cliff, 79, then 71, then 67, while the aggregate kept climbing the whole time. The two lines cross, and nobody watching one dashboard would have seen it."
Why this works
One real trend line, six data points, does more work than a paragraph arguing that averages can hide things.
6
Name the abuse path
Say it like this
"Here's how the wrong metric gets played, and nobody even has to do it on purpose. Pneumothorax is 24 of the 4,000 images in the eval set, about six tenths of one percent. Even if RX-5 missed every single one, zero for 24, that alone would only drag the aggregate down about half a point. The 23-point gain on the other 3,976 images swallows it whole. A model can get dramatically better at 99 percent of the job and get graded almost entirely on that 99 percent."
Why this works
Shows the exact arithmetic mechanism by which an aggregate-only gate gets fooled, not a hand-wave about averages hiding things.
7
Close on the limit, and say what you'd leave alone
Say it like this
"And here's the limit, worth saying plainly. Even with a floor at 91 percent, this system will still miss a pneumothorax sometimes, that's what 91 percent means. What I can promise is that the finding stays gated on its own line, checked against a real eval set, and backed up by RX-4's check until the number holds. What I wouldn't touch: the twenty-some other finding types on that sheet, cardiomegaly, mild atelectasis, degenerative changes, none of them are time-critical. A worse first draft there costs a radiologist a few extra seconds of editing, not a delayed diagnosis."
Why this works
Shows judgment instead of blanket caution, naming exactly which findings need the heavier gate and which don't.

Let's learn

Here's what happens when a model gets dramatically better at almost everything, and quietly worse at exactly the one thing that matters most.

Say a company sells a tool that drafts the first version of a radiology report. A chest X-ray comes in, the model reads it and writes a draft: what it sees, what's normal, what needs a second look. A radiologist reads the draft, fixes it, and signs their name to the version that goes in the patient's chart.

The model in production catches about 84 percent of what a final signed report agrees with, averaged across every kind of finding on the sheet: pneumonia, fluid around the lung, an enlarged heart, and more. Every candidate gets checked against the same fixed set, every single release: 4,000 already-signed chest X-rays, read months ago by real radiologists, used as the answer key.

Knowledge spark: what's an eval set? A fixed stack of test images, already read and signed by real radiologists, used to check a candidate model the same way every release. Run the same 4,000 images against the next candidate, and the two scores actually mean the same thing.

A new candidate, RX-5, pushes that number to 93 percent. Nine points, in one release. It writes cleaner language, catches more of the common findings, hedges less. Everyone who sees the demo likes it.

Pneumothorax recall across six eval builds, while the aggregate score keeps climbing
Critical floor: 91% (rate already live) Training mix changes 84% 93% 91% 79% 67% Build 1 Build 2 Build 3 Build 4 Build 5 Build 6, RX-5
Aggregate report-agreement score Pneumothorax recall, same eval set
The aggregate never stops climbing. Pneumothorax recall crosses under its own floor at build four and keeps falling, two builds before anyone shipped anything. A gate that only reads the top line would have called this a clean win.

Here's the turn. The nine points are not the story. Buried in the same test, one row moved the other way: pneumothorax, a collapsed lung, the kind of finding that can turn fatal within hours if nobody acts. Pneumothorax recall dropped from 91 percent to 67 percent. Nobody who only looked at the top number would ever have seen it, because pneumothorax is 24 rows out of 4,000, about six tenths of one percent of the set. Even a total wipeout on that row would only have cost the aggregate about half a point. The 23-point gain everywhere else buries it completely.

The nine points everyone was celebrating were paid for, quietly, by the twenty-four points nobody was watching.

This is a quiet case of silent degradation: a regression that trips no alarm, because the one dashboard built to catch trouble is exactly the one number built to average it away. The guardrail is the per-finding floor itself, checked before ship, not a promise that it can never happen again.

At its worst, this ships quietly. To find out whether it actually would have, the team ran RX-5 in shadow mode: it drafted real incoming scans at Cavendish Medical for three weeks, silently, next to the model that was actually live and actually seen by radiologists. Five real pneumothorax cases came through in that window.

Knowledge spark: what's shadow mode? A candidate model quietly drafts real, live cases alongside the one that's actually deployed, but nobody sees its answers. It lets you test a model against real cases without ever putting its draft in front of a patient's care team.
Missed pneumothorax cases, three-week shadow pilot at Cavendish Medical
0 of 5
RX-4, still live in production
3 of 5
RX-5, shadow drafts only
Same five real cases, same three weeks. The model still running live caught every one. The candidate everyone wanted to ship Monday missed three, including one large, tension pneumothorax that needed a chest tube within the hour.
A hand-sketch metaphor scene titled How it gets gamed. On the left, a clipboard icon labeled AGGREGATE SCORE, captioned 93 percent, looks great, drawn clean and calm. On the right, a person icon labeled THE ONE THAT MATTERED, captioned wheeled away, unwatched, drawn in red-orange. A hand-lettered VS sits between them.
The clipboard was telling the truth about the average. It just wasn't the truth about row fourteen.
The choice I'd take back A year earlier, when the team built the nightly eval dashboard, they wrote the ship rule as one line: ship if the aggregate agreement score improves release over release. That made sense at the time, every finding type moved together, gains and losses spread evenly across the sheet. I'd take that back. Once the team can retrain however it wants, a training change can genuinely help 99 percent of cases and genuinely hurt the other one percent, and one blended number can't tell those two stories apart. Keeping RX-4's pneumothorax check running alongside RX-5 for eight weeks cost real inference time, about 40 extra milliseconds a scan, and meant the infrastructure team was maintaining two production models instead of one. That's the trade being accepted: slower and pricier for eight weeks, rather than fast and blind on the one row that can kill someone in an hour.

What I'd leave alone. The other twenty-some finding types on that sheet, cardiomegaly, mild atelectasis, degenerative changes, don't need their own gated floor. None of them are time-critical. A slightly worse first draft there costs a radiologist a few more seconds of editing. Gating all thirty rows the same way as pneumothorax would slow down every future migration for a risk that isn't actually there.

The lesson. One number was never going to be enough, because "better" and "better everywhere it matters most" are not the same claim, and a dashboard built around one blended score can only ever answer the first one.

Now here is the same thing as a story

Read this version when you've got the extra few minutes. The short one above is what you'd say in an interview. This is why it's true.

Iskra Kendrick has run the report-drafting product at Pellard Health for three years, and in the first year, every migration got the same treatment: a whole afternoon in a conference room, the team walking a candidate model's score finding by finding, all thirty rows, before anyone signed off on a release.

Then the team built a dashboard. One number, refreshed every night: the aggregate agreement score, how closely a candidate's draft matched what a radiologist actually signed, averaged across every finding type at once. A migration that used to cost an afternoon became a five-minute glance at a green number on a screen. For a year and a half, every candidate that cleared the bar really was better everywhere. The dashboard was never wrong.

The first few releases, Iskra still opened the full thirty-row sheet anyway, out of habit, even when the top number looked fine. After a dozen clean releases in a row, she started only opening it when the top number looked off. By release nineteen, she wasn't opening it at all. Twelve people on the team had shipped the last six candidates off the dashboard number alone, and every one of them had gone fine.

Release twenty was RX-5, due to replace the live model at Cavendish Medical that coming Monday, the biggest hospital account on Pellard's books. The dashboard read 93 percent, up nine points from what was live. Friday afternoon, with nothing wrong on the screen and a full weekend ahead of her, Iskra opened the thirty-row sheet anyway. She couldn't later say exactly why. Boredom, maybe. A habit dying slower than she thought.

Row fourteen was red. Pneumothorax: 91 percent on the model that was live, 67 percent on RX-5. She read it twice, thinking it was a formatting error from the export. It wasn't. She pulled the six builds that led to RX-5 and watched the same story twice: the aggregate score climbing in a straight line, pneumothorax recall falling off a cliff starting at build four, the exact release where the team had changed the training mix to lean harder on the common findings.

Nine straight points of green had flipped the switch from checking to trusting, and nobody was watching whether the switch was still telling the truth about all thirty rows underneath it.

Iskra considered just shipping RX-5 everywhere Monday as planned, pneumothorax included, since it was under one percent of scans and the aggregate case for it was overwhelming. She rejected that within the hour: rare isn't the same as cheap, and a tension pneumothorax missed on a night shift can kill someone before the next morning's read catches it. She also considered freezing the whole release, holding RX-5 back entirely until every row cleared, common findings included. She rejected that too: radiologists were already spending real time every shift cleaning up RX-4's clumsier drafts of pneumonia and effusion reports, and holding nine real points of improvement back for months, to fix one row, traded a smaller certain cost for a bigger one.

What she actually did was block Monday's cutover for one finding only, and spend the weekend setting up a shadow pilot to check her own read of the eval set: RX-5 would draft real incoming scans at Cavendish Medical for three weeks, silently, alongside the model that was actually live and actually seen by radiologists. Five real pneumothorax cases came through in that window. RX-4, still live, caught all five. RX-5's shadow drafts caught two. One of the three it missed was a large, tension pneumothorax, the kind that needs a chest tube within the hour, not the next morning.

I want to say the problem was the model got worse. It did, on one row. But that's not really the story. The dashboard never held thirty numbers in anyone's head. It held one, and that one number only had two settings: green, ship it, or red, stop and look. Nine straight points of green had flipped that switch for good, long before Friday.

A year earlier, when the dashboard first went up on the wall, Iskra had signed off on the ship rule herself: green means ship. It made sense that day. Every migration up to that point had genuinely moved every finding type together, because the training changes were broad enough that a gain anywhere showed up as a gain everywhere. Nobody had reason to think one dial could hide a needle moving the other way underneath it.

The fix took a weekend to design and eight weeks to actually clear: pneumothorax kept running through RX-4's older, still-91-percent check, gated separately, while everything else in RX-5 shipped that Monday as planned. A retrain, RX-5.1, oversampling pneumothorax-positive images specifically, brought recall back to 90 percent, and the finding cut over eight weeks later, on schedule and checked, not assumed. Four months after that, release twenty-six had the exact same shape: a nine-point aggregate gain and a small dip on a different critical finding, the cardiac silhouette obscured by a large effusion. This time the per-finding dashboard flagged it itself, in the Tuesday-morning review, in about twenty minutes. Nobody needed a lucky Friday.

One design put thirty numbers behind one door and trusted the door. The other keeps every door labeled, and the ones that can hurt someone locked separately.

And the thing I'd tell myself, back when we put that dashboard on the wall: a single number is only honest for as long as everything it's averaging moves together. The day that stops being true, and it always stops being true eventually, the number keeps looking fine right up until someone gets unlucky enough to notice.

LEAD, so the aggregate can't swallow the one row that matters

This sounds like a launch-readiness question. Underneath, it's still asking which number you trust when two of them disagree. That's LEAD, run on a migration gate instead of a dashboard.

L, link. The real outcome a migration decision protects. Not a dashboard that says the model is broadly better. A migration Pellard can actually stand behind for every kind of finding a radiologist relies on it for, not just the 99 percent that move the average. → Here, that's whether RX-5 goes live without costing Cavendish Medical a delayed pneumothorax read, not whether the aggregate score looks good in a release note.
E, early signal. The pass rate for each critical finding type, tracked and gated on its own line, separate from the aggregate, checked before ship. → Here, that's pneumothorax recall on the fixed 4,000-image set: a floor at 91 percent, the rate already live in production, a checked rate, not a promise of zero misses.
A, abuse. How an aggregate-only metric gets hit without anyone doing the work everywhere. A model that's dramatically better on the 95 percent of common, easy cases can post a huge aggregate win while quietly failing the 5 percent that matters most. → Here, pneumothorax is 24 of 4,000 images. Missing every single one would cost the aggregate about half a point. A 23-point gain everywhere else buries it completely.
D, decision. What per-case-type tracking genuinely cannot decide for you: whether the aggregate gain is worth accepting the regression at all. That's a judgment call the data informs, not one it makes. → The data says exactly how much better RX-5 is broadly and exactly how much worse it is on pneumothorax. It doesn't say whether that trade is acceptable while the fix ships, running RX-4's check in parallel for eight weeks, at real cost, was Iskra's call to make, not the dashboard's.
The check that proves a floor is real Ask, before any migration ships: "if this one finding type got worse and nothing else changed, would the ship gate have caught it on its own?" If the honest answer is no, the aggregate is the whole gate, and the gate isn't real.

And if you want to be sure it really works, try it somewhere else

Fenchurch Mutual runs an AI tool that scores incoming auto-insurance claims for likely fraud, routing the risky ones to a human investigator instead of paying them out automatically. Branwen Norwick, who owns that product, is looking at a migration candidate that lifts the overall fraud-catch rate from 61 to 74 percent, a genuinely large jump, and quietly drops the catch rate on staged commercial-fleet collisions, a rare, expensive pattern, from 82 to 45 percent.

L. Whether Fenchurch can stand behind the migration for the claim types that actually threaten the loss ratio, not just the ones with the most volume.
E. Fleet-collision fraud catch rate, tracked and gated on its own line, separate from the blended fraud score across every claim type.
A. Fleet-collision fraud is 14 of the 3,500 claims in Fenchurch's audited test set, about four tenths of one percent. The new model's gains on common, low-value staged-injury claims, most of the volume, swamp that one row completely in the blended number.
D. Even a clean per-type floor doesn't say whether the dollar savings from catching more common fraud outweigh the exposure from missing rarer, expensive fraud. That's Branwen's call, not the tracking's.

Branwen set the same kind of floor: fleet-collision catch rate can't drop below 82 percent, checked monthly against the audited set. The new model ships for every other claim type, while the old model's fleet-collision check runs in parallel until a retrain clears the bar. It's a small trade against a big one: a handful of common claims wait an extra day or two for a human look, so that one expensive, rare pattern doesn't slide through unwatched while the fix ships.

A hand-sketch comparison diagram titled Two clocks, same alarm. On the left, a gauge icon labeled AGGREGATE CATCH RATE, captioned still climbing, looks fine, in blue. On the right, a gauge icon labeled FLEET-FRAUD CATCH RATE, captioned already ringing, ahead, in red-orange. A hand-lettered VS sits between them.
Same shape as the chest X-ray story, a different claim file. The aggregate clock was never going to ring first.

Swap the trigger and it still runs

  • The regression is smaller, not larger. Doesn't help. A five-point dip on a life-or-death finding is still a five-point dip; the size of the miss doesn't change whether it needs its own gate.
  • The rare finding is cheap to check by hand. Shrinks the case for holding the ship back, but it still doesn't remove the need to know the regression exists in the first place.
  • The model gets better at the rare finding too, along with everything else. Then there's nothing to catch, and the per-finding floor costs one nightly line item nobody ever has to act on.

Where people run it wrong

  • Building the eval set once and never refreshing it, so a rare finding type stops having enough positive cases to trust a percentage on.
  • Treating every finding type as equally critical, which slows down every future migration for rows that were never actually time-sensitive.
  • Watching the per-finding dashboard closely for a week after a near miss, then quietly going back to checking only the aggregate once nothing else goes wrong.

How to use it live

Say the split out loud, early: "Before we talk about whether this is a good migration, I want to separate two questions: is it better on average, and is it worse anywhere it can't afford to be." That's not stalling, it names the exact place an aggregate-only answer gets this wrong, and it buys you room to check the second question properly instead of only answering the first one.

Flashcards (click a card to flip it)

1 · THE FRAMEWORK
Which framework fits this question, and what does each letter stand for here?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
LEAD. L is the real outcome, a migration Pellard can stand behind on every finding type, not just the 99 percent that move the average. E is the early signal, pneumothorax's own pass rate, tracked and gated separately. A is how it gets gamed, a rare regression swallowed by a huge gain on common cases. D is what the tracking can't decide: whether the aggregate gain is worth the regression at all.
2 · THE PERSON
Who is this answer about?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
Iskra Kendrick, who runs the report-drafting product at Pellard Health, and caught a critical regression in RX-5 the Friday before it was due to replace the live model at Cavendish Medical.
3 · THE HABIT
What did she stop doing because it kept working?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
Opening the full thirty-row, per-finding breakdown before every migration. After a dozen clean releases running off the aggregate score alone, she stopped checking it at all, until the Friday she opened it out of habit anyway.
4 · THE EARLY SIGNAL
What's the E step here, in one line?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
Pneumothorax's own recall rate on the fixed 4,000-image eval set, tracked and gated on its own line with a 91 percent floor, separate from the aggregate score everyone was watching.
5 · THE OLD DECISION
What decision would you take back?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
The ship rule written when the dashboard first went up: green means ship, based on one blended aggregate number, written back when every finding type genuinely moved together.
6 · THE NUMBER
Across six eval builds, the aggregate score climbed from 84 to ______ percent while pneumothorax recall fell from 91 to ______ percent.
Tap to flip
ANSWER
93 percent. 67 percent. Pneumothorax is only 24 of 4,000 images in the set, so missing all of them would have cost the aggregate only about half a point.
7 · THE REPLAY
Release twenty-six has the same shape: a nine-point aggregate gain and a dip on another critical finding. What changes?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
The per-finding dashboard flags it itself, in the Tuesday-morning review, in about twenty minutes. Nobody needs a lucky Friday afternoon this time.
8 · THE TRANSFER
Section four runs this same question again for a different product. Which one, and what does the same fix look like?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
Fenchurch Mutual's auto-claims fraud triage tool. Branwen Norwick set a separate floor for staged fleet-collision fraud, 82 percent, and kept the old model's check running for that claim type while the new model shipped everywhere else.

Check yourself Score: 0 / 0

Fill in the blank
1. The rewritten migration gate set a pneumothorax recall floor of ______ percent, matching the rate already live in production. Pneumothorax made up ______ of the 4,000 images in the audited eval set.
Show hint
Look at the number that matched what RX-4 already scored, and the count from the abuse-path math.
Show answer
91 percent. 24 images. That's about six tenths of one percent of the set, which is exactly why missing all of them barely moved the aggregate.
Multiple choice
2. Why did the aggregate report-agreement score keep climbing even as pneumothorax recall fell to 67 percent?
  • A. Pneumothorax cases were removed from the eval set before the score was calculated.
  • B. Pneumothorax is such a small share of the eval set that its regression barely moves a blended average dominated by common findings.
  • C. Radiologists always catch pneumothorax by hand anyway, so the model's score on it doesn't matter.
  • D. The team retrained specifically to make the aggregate number look better regardless of what it broke.
Show hint
Think about how many of the 4,000 images pneumothorax actually accounts for.
Show answer
B. The other answers describe something that didn't happen, or a safety net that shouldn't be the real plan. At 24 of 4,000 images, even a total wipeout on pneumothorax only costs the aggregate about half a point.
True or false
3. True or false: because RX-5 improved the aggregate score by nine points, it was safe to ship to every hospital, pneumothorax included, the same Monday it was originally scheduled.
  • True
  • False
Show hint
Check what actually shipped that Monday, and what didn't.
Show answer
False. RX-5 breached the critical floor on pneumothorax, a finding that can turn fatal within hours. It shipped everywhere except that one finding, with RX-4's older check running in parallel until a retrain cleared the bar eight weeks later.
Multiple choice
4. Which of these chest X-ray findings genuinely does NOT need its own gated critical floor the way pneumothorax does?
  • A. Cardiomegaly, an enlarged heart, drafted with slightly clumsier wording.
  • B. A large, tension pneumothorax missed on a night shift.
  • C. Free air under the diaphragm, a sign of a perforated organ.
  • D. A missed pneumothorax read as clear on any shift.
Show hint
Look for the one finding where a worse draft costs a few extra seconds, not a delayed emergency.
Show answer
A. Cardiomegaly is real, but a worse first draft there costs a radiologist a few extra seconds of editing. The other three are all time-critical findings where a miss can genuinely cost someone their life within hours.
Short answer, apply it yourself
5. Think of a product you use that shows one overall score or rating. Where might a rare but serious failure be hiding inside that average, and what would you track separately to catch it?
Show hint
Look for a product where almost all of the volume is routine, and one rare case type is much higher-stakes than the rest.
Show answer
Model answer: A food delivery app's overall "on-time rate" could look great while quietly getting worse at flagging severe allergen mismatches, because allergen-flagged orders are a tiny share of total deliveries. Tracking a separate, gated accuracy rate just for allergen-flagged orders, with its own floor, would catch that regression instead of letting a rising on-time average bury it.
Fill in the blank
6. During the three-week shadow pilot, RX-4, still live in production, caught ______ of 5 real pneumothorax cases. RX-5's shadow drafts caught only ______ of 5, missing a large pneumothorax that would have needed a chest tube within the hour.
Show hint
This is the shadow-pilot count, not the eval-build percentages from question 1.
Show answer
5 of 5. 2 of 5. The same gap the eval set predicted showed up again on real, live cases, which is what actually justified holding the migration back for that one finding.
If the interviewer pushes back

Why this works

Tests whether you'll trust a single dashboard number or go looking for the one row it's built to average away. Most candidates stop at "the aggregate improved, ship it."

Follow-up traps

"What if delaying pneumothorax's cutover means Cavendish Medical waits longer for the gains on common findings too?" It doesn't. That's the point of gating one finding instead of the whole release: RX-5 ships everywhere else that Monday as planned, and only pneumothorax keeps running through RX-4's older check until the retrain clears the floor.

"Isn't 24 positive cases too small an eval set to trust a percentage on?" That's exactly why the shadow pilot mattered: three weeks of real cases at Cavendish Medical, not just the fixed set, and the same gap showed up again, RX-4 caught 5 of 5, RX-5 caught 2 of 5, before any patient was actually affected.

If pressed

The retrain that produced RX-5.1 didn't touch the common-finding training data at all. It oversampled pneumothorax-positive images roughly six times over in the fine-tuning set, weighted toward apical and small partial cases, which is where nearly all eight of the originally missed cases had come from.

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