CaseAdvancedQuality, Cost & Token Economics / Pricing AI products: seat, usage, outcome / #15

How would you handle a customer whose usage makes them unprofitable?

LEAD · the customer whose usage is quietly losing you money

Pactline Systems sells ScreenArc to staffing agencies: upload a stack of resumes, get back a ranked shortlist for the job you're trying to fill. Every account also gets a second option, a wide search across the agency's entire resume archive, meant for the handful of roles that are genuinely hard to fill. Nobody is grading whether you can say the word "margin." They are grading whether you can find the number that would have caught this while it was still a five-minute fix, weeks before a customer's invoice ever said the word "unprofitable" out loud.

The direct answer
Watch contribution margin per account, not seat count or raw usage, since both can sit perfectly flat while an account goes underwater beneath them. The early signal is the share of expensive, wide-net matching runs inside a customer's normal usage, because it drifts for weeks before a monthly invoice ever shows red. Act on it in order: nudge the behavior, cap the expensive run type, reprice it transparently, and only let the account go if it still can't clear a margin floor after all three.
In order, not by how it occurred to me
  1. Track contribution margin per account as the real health metric, not seat count or usage volume.Why: Nash Talent Group's 40 seats and about 120 monthly requisitions never moved, so a metric built on either one would have stayed silent while the account went underwater.
  2. Watch the mix, not the volume: what share of a customer's reruns are the expensive, wide-net kind.Why: this is the number that moves five to six weeks before a monthly invoice shows red, while total usage still looks completely normal.
  3. Nudge first, in-app and from a human, the moment that share crosses a low bar.Why: most of this behavior is a habit, not a decision to exploit the tool, and a nudge is the cheapest fix that respects that.
  4. Cap the expensive run type with real friction, a cost confirmation, not a blanket usage limit on the whole account.Why: a blanket cap would have throttled the scoped reruns 39 of Nash Talent Group's 40 seats used perfectly normally, punishing healthy usage to fix one narrow behavior.
  5. Reprice transparently if the cap alone doesn't restore margin within two months.Why: pricing should reflect what a customer is actually driving cost with, not just what they were sold on day one.
  6. Let the account go if it still can't clear a margin floor after nudge, cap, and reprice.Why: a chronically negative account isn't rescued by more patience, it's a mismatch between behavior and price that will just keep recurring.

How to answer this, stage by stage

Nobody is grading whether you can name margin as the metric that matters. They are grading whether you can build the whole chain live: the real number, the signal that beats it, how someone could dodge either one, and what you'd actually do, in that order, out loud.

1
Scope it: pick one concrete product and one real account, not customers as a category
Say it like this
"Let's make this concrete. Say this is ScreenArc, a resume screening tool sold to staffing agencies on a seat plan. I'll answer this for one real account that's actually gone unprofitable, not agencies in general."
Why this works
Grounds the answer in something checkable instead of a policy speech about profitability.
2
Say your structure out loud before naming a single number
Say it like this
"Here's how I'd work this. First, what number actually matters, not the one that's easiest to watch. Second, what moves before that number does. Third, how someone could quietly game either of those. Fourth, what I'd actually do about it, at real thresholds."
Why this works
Signals a method running live, not a memorized definition of "profitability."
3
Reframe: name the real outcome, not the numbers on the contract
Say it like this
"The trap here is watching seats and job postings, because those are the numbers on the contract. But an account can hold 40 seats and 120 open jobs a month, dead flat, and still lose you three thousand dollars that same month. The number that actually matters is contribution margin per account: revenue minus what it really costs to serve them."
Why this works
Without naming the real outcome first, "unprofitable" stays a feeling instead of a number anyone can act on.
4
Name the early signal, the thing that moves before the invoice does
Say it like this
"The signal that moves first is the mix of what kind of run they're doing. Every account has a cheap, scoped rerank and an expensive, search-the-whole-archive rerank. If the expensive one's share of total reruns starts climbing, that's the tell, and it shows up five or six weeks before a single invoice does."
Why this works
This is the real answer to "how would you measure it." A number that only looks bad after the invoice already broke doesn't count as a metric.
5
Name how it gets gamed, by the customer or by your own team
Say it like this
"Two ways this lies to you. If I'd measured cost per seat instead of cost per requisition, a customer could add ten seats nobody uses and the number improves on paper while total spend keeps climbing. And on our side, an account rep worried about a renewal can just approve one more month of grace every cycle, so it never reads as a trend to anyone above them, only a string of one-off asks."
Why this works
A metric nobody's tried to dodge yet is just a metric you haven't actually shipped.
6
Give the decision, at real thresholds, not a promise to "watch it closely"
Say it like this
"So here's what I'd do. Cross fifteen percent wide-net share, the account gets a nudge, in-app and from their rep. Still climbing two weeks later, or it jumps past thirty-five percent, I cap the expensive run type and put a real cost confirmation in front of it. Margin's still under twenty percent two months after that, I move them to a plan where it's billed transparently. If none of that clears ten percent, I let the account go."
Why this works
This is the direct answer, said as four real actions instead of one vague promise to keep an eye on it.
7
Prove it, in four sentences, with the compressed failure behind it
Say it like this
"Here's why I trust this. A real account did exactly this, quietly, over about ten weeks. Nobody's seat count or job count moved, so nobody looked, and the account went from seventy-two percent margin to twenty-three percent negative before a routine monthly report caught it by accident."
Why this works
A framework with no failure behind it is a diagram. This is the four-sentence version of the real story.
8
Close on the one line, restating the decision
Say it like this
"Bottom line: don't manage usage, manage margin. Watch the mix that predicts it, act in stages, nudge, cap, reprice, walk away, and you fire almost nobody, because you caught it while it was still cheap to fix."
Why this works
Leaves the interviewer with the decision, not just an appreciation for the story behind it.

Let's learn

Here's a mean trick a metric can play: it can hold dead still for weeks while the thing underneath it quietly goes broke.

ScreenArc is the tool Pactline Systems sells to staffing agencies. A recruiter uploads a stack of resumes, and ScreenArc reads them and ranks the field against whatever job they're trying to fill.

Before ScreenArc, a Nash Talent Group recruiter spent close to six hours screening 150 resumes against one job opening, reading each one, checking it by hand. With ScreenArc, the same screen takes about twelve minutes: upload the stack, and a ranked shortlist comes back with a plain reason attached to every name.

Knowledge spark: what is contribution margin? What's left of a customer's payment after you subtract what it actually costs to serve them, not what they were sold. A customer can be paying you plenty and still be losing you money, if serving them costs more than they pay.

That's the ordinary story on almost every one of Nash Talent Group's 40 seats, every month. What changed wasn't the time it saved. It was a second button next to the normal one.

ScreenArc's normal rerun checks a job's own shortlist, the 60 to 90 resumes a recruiter actually sourced for that role. It costs Pactline about $3.20 a run. Next to it sits a second option: search the entire archive, all 40,000 resumes Nash Talent Group has collected over three years, instead of just the shortlist. It costs about $38 a run, twelve times as much, and it was built for the rare, genuinely hard-to-fill role.

Hand sketched comparison diagram titled the two buttons before the fix. Left, a document icon labeled scoped rerank, captioned about 3 dollars a run, checks the req's own shortlist. Right, a funnel icon labeled search entire archive, captioned same size button, about 38 dollars a run, all 40,000 resumes.
Same size button, same one click. Twelve times the cost, and nothing on the screen ever said so.
The extra usage was never the problem. Nash Talent Group's seat count stayed at 40. Its open requisitions stayed at about 120 a month. What moved was which button a few recruiters reached for, on almost every job, not just the hard ones.
Archive-wide search, share of Nash Talent Group's reruns, week by week
60% 30% 0 nudge line, 15% cap line, 35% 61%, invoice goes red W1 W4 W7 W10
Archive-wide share of total rerunsWeek the monthly invoice went negative
Seats and job count never moved this whole time. This was the only number that would have caught the drift while it was still cheap to fix.

At its worst: over ten weeks, the wide-net button went from a rare tool to the default first move on most of Nash Talent Group's reqs. The account that used to run at about 72 percent margin ended the month about 23 percent underwater, roughly $3,200 lost that month alone, on a customer paying $14,000 for its seats.

Nash Talent Group's contribution margin: before, during the drift, after the fix
75% 0% -25% 72% Before -23% During drift 67.5% After fix
Baseline, mostly scoped reruns61% wide-net share, unprofitableNudge, cap, and a small reprice
The lagging number the invoice actually shows. By the time it turns red, the leading signal above had already been climbing for five to six weeks.
The choice I would take back Giving the archive-wide search button the same size, the same weight, and zero cost signal as the normal scoped rerun button. It felt like a clean, simple screen when almost nobody used the wide search.

What I'd leave alone: the flat monthly seat subscription, and the normal scoped reruns on 39 of Nash Talent Group's 40 seats, and on nearly every other Pactline account. None of that ever changed. No review needed there.

The lesson: a metric that only watches what a customer bought, seats, job postings, will hold steady right up until the invoice tells you the truth. Watch what a customer actually does with what they bought instead.

Now here is the same thing as a story

Read the longer version below when you want to feel why ten quiet weeks with nothing turning red on a dashboard still ended in a real loss.

Liora Winslet has run recruiting operations for staffing agencies for eleven years, three different firms, and she can tell in the first paragraph of a job order whether it's going to fill itself or fight her the whole way. Nash Talent Group hired her two years ago mostly for that instinct.

ScreenArc arrived in her first spring there, and for months it did exactly what it was sold to do. A recruiter would source forty to ninety resumes for a role, upload them, and get back a ranked shortlist with a plain reason attached to every name: strong match, five years of similar scheduling work, or weak match, no direct customer-facing experience. Twelve minutes instead of most of a morning. Liora liked it enough to put it in the onboarding deck for new hires.

Hand sketched labeled parts diagram titled the Monday report that looked fine. A person icon labeled Amory, margin review, at the center, with four labeled parts around it: 40 seats flat all quarter, about 120 reqs flat all quarter, one line now red, nobody had opened it in weeks.
Every number Pactline actually watched held completely flat, the whole ten weeks.

There was a second button on that same screen, smaller, labeled search entire archive. It ran the same kind of check, but against every resume Nash Talent Group had ever collected, three years and forty thousand of them, instead of just the shortlist a recruiter had actually sourced. Liora's team used it maybe twice a quarter, on the roles that felt hopeless: a bilingual quality inspector for a plant two hours outside anywhere, a warehouse supervisor with a very specific forklift certification nobody local seemed to have. Once, it found someone. A dispatcher role that had sat open for six weeks filled inside two days, because the archive turned up a candidate who'd applied to a completely different Nash Talent Group posting a year earlier and never heard back.

That single win is where the habit really started, and it thinned out in three beats, none of which felt like a decision at the time. Beat one: Liora told her team, informally, in a Tuesday standup, that if a role felt stuck, it was fine to just hit search everything, worst case it doesn't help. Beat two: a couple of recruiters stopped waiting for stuck. They'd run the archive search on a fresh job order right alongside the normal one, just to see. Beat three: by late summer it wasn't a fallback anymore. It was reflex, the second click after uploading a new stack, on almost every requisition, not just the ones actually fighting them.

Nobody at Nash Talent Group ever saw a bill broken out by run type. It wasn't hidden on purpose. It was just never shown.

There was no single Tuesday where it broke. That's the part that still gets me. No catastrophe, no angry email, no obvious mistake anyone could point at. Just ten quiet weeks where the button people reached for first kept changing, while every number Pactline Systems actually watched, forty seats, about a hundred and twenty open jobs a month, held completely flat the entire time.

Hand sketched timeline titled ten weeks nobody was watching. Four milestones: week 1 baseline 5 percent wide net, week 4 nudge line crossed 15 percent, week 7 cap line crossed 36 percent, week 10 invoice goes red 61 percent, highlighted in plum.
Nobody decided, on any one of these weeks, to let it keep climbing. It just never had a line drawn under it.

I found it the boring way, on a routine monthly margin review, the kind I run across forty accounts without expecting to find anything. One line, Nash Talent Group, was negative. I checked it twice assuming a billing error. It wasn't a billing error. It was a real customer, paying us fourteen thousand dollars a month, that we were actually losing money to serve.

We did not lose money because Nash Talent Group used ScreenArc more. We lost it because a habit changed which button got clicked first, and nothing on our side was built to notice that.

Pulling the usage log back ten weeks told the real story. Archive-wide search had gone from five percent of the account's reruns to sixty-one percent, climbing every single week, while seats and job count never so much as flickered. By the time the invoice caught it, the account had already been bleeding for over a month.

The decision I would take back happened much earlier than any of that, in a short product meeting almost a year before Liora ever joined. Someone asked whether the archive search needed its own visual treatment, a cost badge, a confirmation step, anything that marked it as different from the normal rerun. The answer was no, because almost nobody used it, and marking it up felt like clutter on a clean screen. That was true when it was true.

Run that meeting again with one change: the archive button gets its own weight from day one, a small line underneath it, about 40,000 resumes, costs more, best for roles open three weeks or longer. Recruiters still get to use it exactly as often as the job genuinely needs it. They just can't reach for it without seeing, every time, that it isn't the same button.

Replayed with the real fix in place: the nudge lands the moment wide-net share crosses fifteen percent, in-app and from Nash Talent Group's account rep, the week it happens, not the month after. The hard cap, twenty archive runs included, a real cost confirmation past that, catches anything the nudge doesn't. Four weeks later, wide-net share is back down near eight percent. The account's margin, which bottomed out at twenty-three percent negative, is back above sixty-seven percent, and it never has the chance to fall further than that first month's loss.

One design let a habit run for ten weeks with nothing to slow it down. The other one puts a small, honest cost label right in the way of the exact click that caused all of it.

What I'd tell myself, back in that meeting nobody remembers: making the expensive option look identical to the cheap one was never really about a clean screen. It was a bet that nobody would ever lean on it out of habit. Nobody ever checked whether that bet was still true a year later.

LEAD, and the two numbers that stayed perfectly still

Not a checklist to recite. This is what stops "usage went up" from quietly standing in for "we know why this account is bleeding money," which are not the same sentence.

LLink. What's the real business outcome, not the numbers written into the contract?
Contribution margin per account: revenue minus what it actually costs, in inference and support, to serve them. Not seats, not requisitions, not "usage" as a headline count, because all three of those can sit completely still while margin goes negative underneath them.
Name the real outcome before naming any signal, or you're measuring something a customer bought instead of something they're doing.
EEarly signal. What moves weeks before that outcome does?
The share of a customer's reruns that are the expensive, archive-wide kind instead of the normal scoped kind. It climbed from 5 percent to 61 percent over ten weeks while seats and job count never moved, and it would have been visible and actionable the whole time, at a fraction of the eventual loss.
This is the real answer to "how would you measure it." A number that looks fine right up until the invoice doesn't isn't a metric, it's a delay.
AAbuse. How does this get gamed, by the customer or by your own team?
Measure cost per seat instead of cost per requisition, and a customer can pad unused seats to water the number down while real spend keeps climbing. Or, on our side, an account rep can quietly approve "one more month" of grace every renewal cycle, so the pattern never reads as a trend to anyone above them, only a string of one-off asks.
This is the hardest step, and the one a fast answer skips. A metric nobody's found a way around yet is a metric you haven't actually shipped.
DDecision. What do you actually do, at real thresholds?
15 percent wide-net share, nudge. Still climbing at two weeks, or past 35 percent, hard cap with a real cost confirmation. Margin still under 20 percent two months later, reprice transparently. Still under 10 percent after all three, let the account go.
A metric with no attached action is a chart on a wall. Name the number that makes you do something different, every single time it's crossed.
Hand sketched metaphor scene titled how the wrong metric gets fooled. Left, a person icon labeled cost per seat, captioned 10 unused seats added, the number drops on paper. Right, a gauge icon labeled real spend, captioned actual inference burn keeps climbing anyway.
A per-seat number can be diluted by adding seats. A per-requisition number can't, because a requisition still costs what it costs to serve.

Three things worth stating directly, since the real judgment sits here. The alternative Pactline actually considered, and rejected, was folding the growing archive-search cost into next year's list price for every account, spreading Nash Talent Group's own pattern across customers whose usage was completely normal. It lost because it would have made every healthy account subsidize one customer's habit, and it wouldn't have fixed the actual cause, a recruiter clicking an expensive button with no idea it was expensive.

Hand sketched metaphor scene titled the wide search a stale archive cannot actually pay off. Left, a document icon labeled the archive, captioned 40,000 resumes, three years, never pruned. Right, a question mark icon labeled what it returns, captioned duplicates, dead numbers, candidates long since placed.
The extra spend doesn't even reliably buy a better shortlist if the pool it's searching has gone stale.

The AI-specific failure worth naming by name is silent corpus decay: the archive itself gets noisier every year, full of duplicates and candidates long since placed elsewhere, so the expensive search doesn't even reliably return better matches, it just returns more of them from a pool that's quietly gone stale. The guardrail is a routine dedup and freshness pass on the archive, with a plain freshness note next to the search button, so the extra spend at least buys what it claims to. None of this is free: the cap and the cost confirmation add a real click of friction to a workflow that used to be one click, and Pactline is trading a little recruiter convenience for keeping the account's math sane and the real cost of that click visible instead of hidden.

And if you want to be sure it really works, try it somewhere else

Same four letters, a crop-disease scanner instead of a resume screen, and this time the lever isn't how wide a search runs. It's how often the expensive check runs when nothing's actually wrong.

LeafGauge is Kepler Field Data's tool for farm co-ops: a phone photo of a few leaves runs through a light model and flags anything that looks like early blight or rust, for about six cents a scan. A second mode, a full multispectral drone pass processed by a heavier model, catches disease before it's visible to the eye, at about fourteen dollars a field per pass. It's meant for fields with a recent flag or a known disease history, maybe one field in ten in a normal week.

Odalie Cadmus runs field operations for Trentham Growers Co-op. A bad blight season two years before LeafGauge arrived cost the co-op a third of one variety's yield, and she still thinks about it. Once LeafGauge gave her a way to check more often, she started running the deep multispectral pass on every field, every week, flagged or not, just to be safe. Nobody at Kepler's end noticed, because the number they watched, total acres under contract, never moved. Deep-pass share of all field-weeks climbed from about 10 percent to 70 percent over one growing season, and Trentham Growers' account margin followed almost the same shape as Nash Talent Group's.

Hand sketched quadrant diagram titled which field actually needed the expensive pass. X axis how worried Odalie felt, from calm to anxious. Y axis real disease risk that week, from low to high. A field flagged last week plotted high on both axes. A healthy field scanned anyway plotted high worry, low risk. A new field with no history plotted low on both.
The field that earned the expensive pass and the field that got it were often two different fields.

Same rank, different lever: the segment that needed the guarded slice is still the one to find first, but the axis isn't how far a search reaches, it's whether the expensive check is running because a field actually earned it or because someone's still spooked from two seasons back. Kepler's team held price, put a plain flag, last check clear, three weeks ago, next to the deep-pass button so Odalie could see when she was paying for reassurance instead of information, and only capped weekly deep passes on fields with no flag and no history.

Swap the trigger and it still runs.
Speed: an interviewer gives you ninety seconds. Skip straight to the order: link to margin, watch the mix, name how it's gamed, act in stages.
Cost: there's no budget this quarter for both a usage-mix dashboard and a friction-adding confirmation screen. Build the dashboard first. You can't act on a threshold you can't see, and a confirmation screen with nothing behind it is just an annoyance.
The model got better, for real: say the archive search actually got more accurate, not just more expensive. That changes what the nudge says, better matches are available now if the role's genuinely stuck, but the order barely moves. You'd still want the mix watched and the cost visible, because better and free-to-use-constantly are not the same fact.

Where people run it wrong.
They watch what a customer bought instead of what a customer does with it.
They define the metric per seat, which is exactly the number a customer can quietly water down.
They cap everything account-wide because it's simpler to build, and end up throttling the 95 percent of usage that was never the problem.

How to use it live. Say the real question out loud before naming a metric: "am I about to measure what they paid for, or what they're actually doing with it." That buys a beat to find the real signal instead of reaching for the easiest number already sitting in the contract.

Flashcards (tap any card to flip it)

1 · THE FRAMEWORK
What framework is this, and what's its one job?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
LEAD: find the signal that moves first. Built for metric questions, including "how would you handle a customer whose usage is unprofitable": deciding what to actually watch, not just what to react to.
2 · THE PEOPLE
Who is this answer about?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
Amory Vidal, the Pactline Systems PM who owns ScreenArc's unit economics, and Liora Winslet, the VP of Ops at Nash Talent Group whose team's habit drove the drift.
3 · THE NUMBERS THAT NEVER MOVED
What stayed completely flat while the account went unprofitable?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
Nash Talent Group's 40 seats and its roughly 120 open requisitions a month. Both held steady the entire ten weeks, which is exactly why nobody caught the drift by watching them.
4 · THE EARLY SIGNAL
What's the leading signal in this story?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
Archive-wide bulk match runs as a share of the account's total reruns. It drifted from 5 percent to 61 percent over ten weeks before the invoice caught it.
5 · THE OLD DECISION
What decision would Amory take back?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
Giving the archive-wide search button the same size and weight as the normal scoped rerun button, with no cost or scope signal attached, made when almost nobody used it.
6 · THE NUMBER
Fill in the blank: Nash Talent Group's account margin went from ___ percent to ___ percent over about ten weeks.
Tap to flip
ANSWER
72 percent positive to 23 percent negative, a swing of about $13,200 a month on a $14,000 account.
7 · THE REPLAY
Same drift, caught early this time. What changes?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
Nudge at 15 percent, hard cap with a cost confirmation at 35 percent, reprice transparently if margin's still under 20 percent after two months. Margin recovers to about 67.5 percent and never falls further than the first month's loss.
8 · CROSS-PRODUCT TRANSFER
Section 4 answers this same question for a different product. Which product, and what's the different lever?
Tap to flip
ANSWER
LeafGauge, a crop-disease scanner sold to farm co-ops by Kepler Field Data. There the lever is how often the expensive scan runs without a real flag, not how wide a search runs.

Check yourself Score: 0 / 0

Multiple choice
1. Why did Nash Talent Group's account go negative without tripping any of Pactline's normal usage alerts?
  • A. Seat count and requisition count, the numbers being watched, never moved
  • B. ScreenArc's model started hallucinating candidate names
  • C. Nash Talent Group secretly added more seats to their plan
  • D. Pactline's servers went down for two days
Show hint
Look at what actually held flat for ten weeks while margin cratered underneath it.
Show answer
A. Both numbers Pactline actually watched, 40 seats and about 120 open jobs a month, stayed completely flat. The real change was in which button got clicked, and nothing built on seats or job count could see that.
Fill in the blank
2. The metric that would have caught this five to six weeks early was the share of a customer's reruns that were ______ instead of scoped.
Show hint
It's named directly in the E step of the framework recap.
Show answer
Archive-wide (wide-net) runs. Watching this directly turns a monthly surprise on an invoice into a five-minute fix caught weeks earlier.
True or false
3. True or false: tracking inference cost per seat instead of per requisition would have caught this drift just as early.
  • True
  • False
Show hint
Look at the Abuse step in the framework recap. What can a customer do to a per-seat number that they can't do to a per-requisition number?
Show answer
False. A customer can pad unused seats to dilute a per-seat number while total burn keeps climbing. That's exactly the abuse this answer names, and it's why the metric has to be scoped to requisitions, not seats purchased.
Short answer, name the old decision
4. What old decision would Amory take back, and why did it make sense when it was made?
Show hint
Look at the key point box titled "The choice I would take back," in Let's learn.
Show answer
Model answer: Giving the archive-wide search button the same visual weight and zero cost signal as the normal scoped rerun button. It made sense when almost nobody used it, and marking it up felt like unnecessary clutter on a clean screen; nobody expected a whole team to make it their reflex a year later.
Short answer, apply it yourself
5. Pick a product you use that has a cheap, normal version of an action and a more expensive, wide or deep version of the same action. What's one early signal that would tell the company you'd started leaning on the expensive one out of habit, not real need?
Show hint
Think about what "using it more" might be hiding. Is it more use because the task needs it, or more use because it's easy to reach for?
Show answer
Model answer: A note-taking app with a quick-capture mode and a slower "deep research" mode that calls a bigger model. If the share of notes using deep research climbed steadily without the notes actually getting longer or more complex, that mismatch would be the early signal, well before the server bill made it obvious.
Fill in the blank, work the number
6. If Nash Talent Group's archive-wide share had been caught and held at the 35 percent cap line instead of climbing to 61 percent, would the account still have gone unprofitable that month?
Show hint
Work out the inference cost at 35 percent of the same total rerun volume, then compare it against the $14,000 in revenue.
Show answer
No. At 35 percent, margin lands around positive 14 percent, thin, but not negative. That's why 15 and 35 percent are the thresholds that actually matter, not 61 percent. By 61 percent it's already too late to catch cheaply.
Before you close the answer
Why this works
Tests whether you'll manage the number a contract sells, seats, usage, or the number that actually predicts a loss. Most candidates treat "how would you measure it" as a synonym for "how would you know they used it a lot."
Follow-up traps
"Isn't nudging first just delaying the fix?" Response: no, most of this was habit, not exploitation, and a nudge is the cheapest fix that respects that. It's why wide-net share dropped so fast once someone actually named the cost out loud.

"What if the customer's archive search really is finding better candidates?" Response: then the mix should show it, a real placement rate lift on the flagged reqs, and that would justify raising their allowance instead of capping it. Nash Talent Group's pattern showed neither.
If pressed
The freshness pass on the archive isn't a one-time cleanup. It re-scores every resume's eligibility weekly against a simple rule, no update in over 18 months, or marked placed by any recruiter, and quietly excludes those from an archive-wide search instead of deleting them, so the wide search stays honestly wide without staying honestly stale.
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